Differentia: Review of Italian Thought
Number 8 Combined Issue 8-9 Spring/Autumn

Article 10

1999

Community/Difference: The Tragic Community of Beings
Adelino Zanini

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia

Recommended Citation
Zanini, Adelino (1999) "Community/Difference: The Tragic Community of Beings," Differentia: Review of
Italian Thought: Vol. 8 , Article 10.
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol8/iss1/10

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu.

Community/ Difference:
The Tragic Community
of Beings
Adelino Zanini
1. Modern/Postm odern

Il problemaJilosoficodellamodernitaera rappresentatodallacondizione
del soggettocomeesserecapacedi diventareplurale;problemalasciatoinsoluto dalla modernitaeil soggettodivenuto plurale ma, per sua condizione,ritiratosi in universi singolari,assolutamenteomogeneinella loroforma, quanta
irripetibilinella loro serialita. Una stessa condizione,riprodottain serie, ma
non piit vissuta come mezzo per proporre il plurale come valore capacedi
superarequellaserie. Io vedo in cio quanta di piit irresolubile esista nell'orizzonte del pensierocritico.La condizionemodernaha di fatto esauritoun ciclo
espansivo del pensiero: ogni vocazionefilosofica che ambiva ad una liberazione dell'umanodal limite si edovuta misurarecon una duplicecrisi:da un
lato, con l'ingovernabilitadell'oggettoche aveva contribuitoa creare,dall'altro, con l'insubordinazionedei soggetti che, spesso, ne avevano anticipatolo
sviluppo. La condizione moderna, dunque, quanta piit ha espresso un'alta
socializzazionee razionalizzazione,tanto piit ha generato "luoghi" del differire, .. . caduchi non per condizione,ma per relazione-non rispetto alla
potenza, ma al potere.In cio, d'altra parte, in questo residuaree moltiplicare
di potenze, il compiersidel ciclo si e tramutato in un rimando continua. Il
modernoecostante residuaredell'essere,il differireesprimepotenza e residua
storia. Effettivamente, tra Nietzsche e Heidegger il compimento sembrava
definitivamente inverato, giaccheaveva condottofuori da ogni dialettica.In
realta,cio cheJuribadito-oltre ogni umanesimofenomenologicoed esistenzialistico-fu propriol'esserecome rimando:una comunita dell' esseretragico. (Zanini 1991)
Modern/Postmodern:
it is certainly not a dialectical dyad, nor a
time sequence. It is an unsolved problematic point-perhaps
with no
solution - almost an abyss, from which the philosophical intelligence
of the last ten years has not managed to emerge1. The Modern is unresolved, because it is unresolvable. The Postmodern is not the fulfillment of any tradition, because Western metaphysics cannot be fulfilled
until collective forms of subjectivity-lacerated
and plural as much as
you like- deposit an absent reminder of being. For these reasons, I am
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convinced that it is useless to try to define a time scansion, ages of
thought defined in time by a Modernity eventually achieved and by a
Postmodernity displayed before us in any case-if you like, as a simple strong "ideology." The presence of a possible, fatal, certainly indefinite, hypothetical "transit" is looming up.
All this in order to put forward two aspects: I doubt it is possible
to assume the diversity between Modern and Postmodern as an irrevocable time transaction; I doubt it is necessary to label postmodern
ideology as progressive or not. We are faced with a given theoretical
reality: again bringing up the question of the essential paradigms of
Modernity-rationality
and subject, in primis-articulated in sociological, scientific and philosophical reflections. This reality is strong. It is,
of course, a reality which is implicit in the modernity of authors such
as Marx, Nietzsche, Weber, Heidegger, Wittgenstein; it is a reality
which was not "created" but assumed by the Postmodern, without
having to "expect" any fatal achievement. This is the point: it does not
go without saying that Modernity may be achieved, it does not go
without saying that Postmodernity can legitimize itself only after this
eventual achievement. Il moderno persiste nel residuare un problemadi
fondo: una communita dell'esseretragico;il postmoderno-quando none chiacchiera-amplificaquestoproblemacomecondizione.
2. Habermas versus Weber

Habermas, it must be said, has forcefully addressed this set of
problems 2 • I doubt that Habermasian solutions really solve the problems, but they do repropose, in no uncertain terms, the real questions
in their doctrinal complexity. However, I do not wish to discuss the
very complicated articulations of Habermasian solutions, but rather
their ethical-linguistic implications, in relation to one of their polemical referents. Attention has already been given to the eventual comparison between Habermas and Lyotard's reflection 3 (Rorty 1984). From
my point of view, I will just consider it from one particular aspect,
inherent to the rationality/ subject relationship; a relationship which is
dominated by a linguistic "excess". For convenience, I'll follow the
Habermasian course starting from the cruciality of the theme of rationalization in the Weberian sociology of religions.
It is well known, thanks to a series of valuable works, that the
subject of rationalization has found in Weber its genesis in the comparative studies of the so-called world religions. The subject of Western
rationalization, in particular, has been efficaciously understood from
the subjects of the sociology of religions. Essentially, from a Weberian
point of view, a religious disposition induces man to calculate the consequences of his actions on the basis of expectations; inevitably, this
attitude promotes a calculating rationality, which makes man rational-
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ize his existence with respect to what surpasses and confounds human
sense. Of course, modern science can meet the earthly needs to face
uncertainty and human pain; however, the questions which remain
continue as an unacceptable limit. The search for a superior instance
motivates the need to find an extreme ratio, which better explains the
sense, even extreme, of the human condition.
Briefly, this is the space where the excess of the sacred is placed;
on the other hand, this excess, humanizing in the extreme the presence
of God in the World, can only reduce God in the World. Effectively, if
God is expressed in and for the World, questioning the sense of the latter we can find the ultimate answers: the sense of this extreme ratio is
resolved in the disenchantment and secularization of the divine image.
By means of the paradox of theodicy, man discovers the sacred in
mundane habits, he experiences, at the same time, freedom in excess:
the relativization of all values, disenchantment and politeism. The line
of escape of the Weberian sociology of religions can only indicate in
Politics, therefore, the instance in which the Modern is accomplished:
it is rationalization.
Such an outcome, until a few years ago ascribed only to Weber's
political and economical works, therefore, has been completely
"re-written" by Habermas in his Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns.
He confirms, of course, that the subject of rationalization has found in
Weber its essential point in theodicy-to which it follows, moreover,
not only the proclaimed politeism of values, but the most radical thesis of the loss of meaning of the World-but he comments: "In him
[M.W.], that experience of nihilism-typical
of his generation-which
Nietzsche had strikingly emphasized, is reflected: reason splits into a
plurality of spheres of value and destroys its universality (Habermas
1986, I, 349-350). It is clear that a strategic insufficiency in the Weberian
theory of action is immediately apparent to Habermas, since in the
very dispersion of distinct rationality, of spheres of value which break
up the universality of reason, he indicates an inadequate schematism.
Briefly, Weber would venture "too far when from the loss of the substantial unity of reason he infers a politeism of the strength of faith in
conflict, whose irreconcilability is rooted in a pluralism of the incompatible instances of validity," because "on a formal level of argumentative satisfaction of pretenses of validity, the unity of rationality in the
multiplicity of the spheres of value rationalized according to its own
autonomy is guaranteed" (Habermas 1986, I, 352).
Substantially, the rejection of the Weberian "steel cage" is aimed
against the insufficiency of a theory of action which, in the Weberian
process of rationalization, is accomplished in rationality with respect
to the aim, lacking the extension on an institutional level of that broad
concept of rationality which Weber placed "as the basis of his investigations into cultural
traditions"
(Habermas
1986, I, 358).
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Disenchantment, actually, if intended as a space of the exclusive domination of calculating action, simplifies the different meanings of the
rationality of a social action.
Putting aside the considerations that the Habermasian "re-writing" stimulates, let us try to gather the essence of this complex argumentation. Evidently, the critical point is Weber's reduction of the
rationality of action to mere instrumental
intention. Obviously,
Habermas does not intend to misunderstand the importance of instrumental rationality; but he insists on those distinctions which should
save, so to say, what has "universal" value in rationality. The theory of
communicative action is this: the expression of rationality, constituted
by reasons of last instance, belonging to "agents with language and
action," subject to, and "accessible to an objective evaluation"
(Habermas 1986, I, 79).
Very synthetically, the agents, whose actions meet, cannot be
intended as mere executors of processes of rationalization foreign to
them; their meeting each other comes about on the horizon of a
Lebensweltmade up of "the basic convictions, more or less widely held,
ever a-problematic." This is why, of course, meeting each other and
understanding each other must define the space within which "the
agents communicatively set the situational contexts which are problematic each time, in need of agreement" (Habermas 1986, I, 138). The
theory of communicative action is not represented, therefore, as a procedure with forgone harmonic results, at all. It is much more realistic
to imagine a "groping" procedure, in which one goes "from one occasional convergence to another" (Habermas 1986, I, 177). So, the concept of Verstiindigung, as a "process of convergence between subjects
capable of language and action" (Habermas 1986, I, 395), is absolutely
problematic, distinct from a "mere factual convergence" and, therefore, an unimposed expression "of a rationally motivated assent." But
in any case, what is relevant is this distinguishing, in rationality,
between what is instrumental action from what is available for understanding between the agents capable of language and action, who
establish interpersonal relationships, try to understand each other, just
in order to coordinate their mutual action. Therefore, "the problematic
of rationality" is an essential reference mark, since communicative
actions always need "a rational interpretations
in formulations"
(Habermas 1986, I, 183).
The aim of the theory of communicative action is therefore to
permit "a conceptualization of the social nexus of the life, which is cut
out on paradoxes
of modernity"
(Habermas
1986, I, 46 ). The
Habermasian project must be referred to in order to understand the
Modern as is expressly indicated in the ample and less monumental
subsequent reflections to Theorie: Die philosophische Diskurs der
Moderne.
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Habermas, actually, is an irreducible critic of the presumed transition between Modern and Postmodern: Modern is "unachieved project." This is true, in so far as the meditations which should have made
postmodern argumentation sensible-meaning
by the latter the strenuous and radical criticism of rationality-rather
than render the overcoming of the background on which the Modern is measuring itself
possible-the philosophy of the subject, in the first place-have systematically re-prosed it as an umesolved theme (Habermas 1987, 57).
This is true for Hegel, whose Absolute "uses the philosophy of
the subject in order to overcome the reason centered in the subject,"
defining itself, however, as "the infinite process of self-connection,
which absorbs within itself all the finite" (Habermas 1987, 35-37); this
is true for Marx, whose philosophy of praxis "remains a variation of
the philosophy of subject, which does not place reason in the meditation of the knowing subject, but in the finalistic rationality of the subject agent" (Habermas 1987, 67). Far more complex, it is true, is the
process starting from the Nietzschean meditation; nevertheless, it
becomes crucial for this reason: there where the tension about the
Human is extreme, in fact, one reaches that "particular theodicy,
according to which the world may be justified only as an aesthetic
phenomenon"
(Habermas
1987, 98). It follows, according to
Habermas, that the Nietzschean "unmasking rational criticism of reason" is caught up "in the dilemma of a criticism of reason which refers
to itself and has become total." Substantially, "Nietzsche must affirm, (
... ), the possibility of a criticism of metaphysics, which exhumes the
roots of metaphysical thought" (Habermas 1987, 100); therefore, the
thought of the origins in no case overflows from Modernity: neither
with Nietzsche, nor with the most radical interpreters of the end of
Western metaphysics. It does not overflow with Heidegger (Habermas
1987, 141), in whose philosophy "an authentically human privilege
which requires explanation" remains; nor with Derrida, who "inherits
the weaknesses of a criticism of metaphysics which cannot free itself
from the intention of the philosophy of the original" (Habermas 1987,
184); nor, mutatis mutandis, it overflows with Foucault, whose concept
of Power, besides being "borrowed from the same subjective philosophy" (Habermas 1987, 278), remains moreover caught up in an indefinable antagonism "of the disqualified knowledge of the 'people' "
(Habermas 1987, 284).
If the instance of the reconciliation of the subject seems to be
essential for Hegel and Marx, an aesthetic and ecstatic dimension
seems essential for Nietzsche and Heidegger, for Derrida and
Foucault. Metaphysics as Word, the subject as a Body cannot be
renounced. For this reason, Modernity is at least unfinished, and
Habermas repeats his point of view. The Modern is unfinished because
the disownment of a strong subject by a weak subject does not go out-
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side a philosophy of the subject. As the different assumptions of a
weak subject are based on the contraposition between instrumental
reason and the crisis of reason, they lose, with the sense of discursive
rationality, the possibility of changing the approach, of renouncing the
immense task of crowning metaphysics.
Only to such a renunciation would follow in fact the possibility
to instigate "the subversive force of the same modern thought against
the paradigm of the philosophy of the conscience applied from
Descartes to Kant" (Habermas 1987, 312). And there would follow also
the retrieval of rationality as a disposition of agents and talking subjects, able to acquire a fallible knowledge. Substantially, the leading of
communicative action as far as "conceiving the rational praxis as
embodied in history, in society, in bodies and in languages."
(Habermas 1987, 318). In the social relationships-where
instrumental
action is entwined with communicative action-the Lebenswelt,as the
original belonging to every agent, would substitute the "conscience"
of the subject: "With the concepts, which integrate each other, of communicative action and of the world of life, there is introduced a difference between determinations which-differently
from the difference
between labour and nature--does not dissolve again as moments in a
superior unity." "The procedures for the discursive formation of will
established, in a structurally differentiated way, in the world of life are
destined to ensure social links of everyone with everyone, through the
equal considerations of the interests of each individual" (Habermas
1987, 341-45).
We accept this hypothesis provisionally-even
though it is no
less important that the accomplishment of the Modern "exclaimed" by
Heidegger or by Foucault does not allude purposely to any postmodern typology. We accept, hypothetically, that the Habermasian confrontation with the philosophy of praxis is resolutive. A singular situation results. Habermas, by "linguistically" confirming the existence of
a social, dialogical link, arrives at proposal which are at least partially
similar (Habermas 1987, 363) to those which Lyotard reaches after
denying the resistance of the same social link. Evidently, something is
wrong. Perhaps, the maintenance of rationality is not sufficient to differentiate Habermasian language from Lyotardian language; perhaps,
the "linguistic" act works, both in the accomplishment of Habermasian' s Modern and in Lyotard's invoked dissolution of it, as an exemplifying and simplifying referent. This hypothesis is, all things considered, not far-fetched, and is sufficiently easy to structure itself
through a concise comparison.
3. Lyotard versus Habermas

In comparison with Habermas, Lyotard's criticism starts from an
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essential assumption: the search for the linguistic univocity in ordinary language is certainly "une tache noble," however, it remains a
platonic instance: it remains dialogue. Or rather, such a search must
bear a weight which in the end is excessive: the weight of an indemonstrable universality and rationality of communication. The dialogical
instance is in essence platonic in the end, because it does not grasp in
the "epilogues de la modernite" -Kant and Wittgenstein-the
drying
up of a unirational and universalistic approach (Lyotard 1983, 11). To
be explicit, Lyotard's criticism of Habermas contained in La condition
postmodern points out that the Habermasian instance of the Diskurs
gets caught up in "the search for a universal consent," obtainable in a
dialogical way; in this way, says Lyotard, the heteronomy of the rules
and the search for dissent disappear. In the Habermasian Diskurs, in
fact, the modern instance of-emancipation, as a "universal" discourse,
remains integral.
Lyotard's criticism of Habermas are certainly pertinent. One
could in any case ask if Lyotard' s criticism on the one hand, and the
Habermasian universalism, on the other, are really irreducible if they
are translated in terms of "practical reason." It is true, in Lyotard, the
differendis the instance which removes the dialogical consent as telos;
nevertheless, I do not feel that in the latest Habermas, the consent, feasible in a dialogical form, interprets its universality as completeness.
Of course, rational instance has an insuppressible
space for
Habermas-not
like Lyotard's-and
it confides in the dialogically feasible agreement. It does not presuppose a universal consent, it is a
local consent, even if it is, of course, on a dialogical basis.
On the other hand-when
we reach the "practical reason" of the
linguistic act, what we are interested in-not
even Lyotard can
renounce mutual understanding, a transitory consent (probably, one
could discuss about the means which make this consent possible; it
may express itself through silences, but it is still a relationship, otherwise the con-senso(consensus)is a contradiction in terms). If this is true,
the following comparison may be indicative.
Habermas:
For both the [interpreting] sides, the interpretative task consists of
including the other's interpretation of the situation in one's own interpretation [ ... ]. However, this does not mean that the interpretation
must produce in any case, or normally, a stable, differentiated correlation unequivocably. The stability and unequivocability rather represent
the exception in normal everyday communicative praxis. More realistic
is the image of a diffused, fragmentary communication, which undergoes a constant revision, which is only momentarily sucessful, in which
the participants base themselves on unclear and problematic presuppositions, groping their way from one chance convergence to another.
(1986, I, 177).
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The recognition of the heteromorphia of the linguistic games is a first
step ... ). It implies ( . . . ) the relinquishment of terror, which supposes
and attempts to realize its isomorphia. The second step is the principle
on the basis of which, if consent exists about the rules which define each
game and about the "norms" which are put into practice in it, this consent ought to be local, obtained by the interlocutors moment by moment
and subject to possible revision. (1981, 120)

Dialogue/ dissension: it would be wrong to reduce the differences excessively-not by accident Habermas proposes as the critical
object that Postmodern which Lyotard would just ascertain. However,
it may be noted that the focalization of ethical intelligence on linguistic
acts greatly reduces the margins of differing, where one reaches a
"practical reason" departing from strong common starting points-in
this case, Wittgenstein . This, in fact, may transform itself into a real
linguistic excess, if it is deprived of that mystic enchantment which
Wittgenstein explicitly leads to. Substantially, the problems are at least
twofold: the first contemplates the respective coherences of these linguistic excesses; the latter should measure the degree of credibility, in
terms of "practical reason", which these excesses may exhibit since
they are both expressions of what surpasses any residual of subjective
philosophy.
Now, the excess does not create any flaw in the internal coherence of the Lyotardian postmodern theory: not just because every philosophy of history is naturally absent, but because every intention
towards projectable results in history is absent as well: Politics, after
all, is just one of the tragic beings, aesthetically lived as "rules," with
no necessary links with rationality. Linguistic excess, in this case, does
not show anything, it just shows itself in the transparency realized by
the Modern and accomplished by the Postmodern.
Similar observations, for obvious reasons, are not applicable to
Habermas. Not so much because there is a historicistic residual in his
theory, but because the intention towards history (which is not philosophy of history) is there and it is shown in the conviction that rationality has an unequivocable place and that transparency, disenchantment,
though dialectically irredeemable, are beings given but modifiable by
rationally motivated reasons of agreement. Of course, no matter what
Habermas says, communicative action does not turn into the semantics of language: anyway it is hard to understand how it can mediate
an undoubted privilege of linguistic action, where language is a later
ratification
of otherwise
explicit behavior;
or rather, as the
undoubtable privilege of linguistic action is not necessarily the privilege of "saying," even where the source of con-sentireand dis-sentireare
rationally unpronounceable. It is in these terms, besides, that Lyotard's
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criticism of Habermas explains itself, because linguistic excess in both
authors assumes strategies which are differently connected with rationality.
What returns to reproduce similitudes between our two authors
is the demolition of any residual subjective philosophy as a common
strategy just to linguistic excess-demolition
in which simplifying
moments are certainly not missing. The most important of these is
surely the one according to which the subject is only what the Word
represents (or can no longer represent) as it is conscience. In short, it is
the Cartesian subject which Husserl criticized, in this form meditated
and remeditated by the Heideggerian and hermeneutical tradition,
easily "compromised" by Luhmannian functionalism, or, it is a vulgar
Marxian Prometheus, of which, thank God, we cannot remember. Such
a subject, always singular, not by accident (Nancy 1990), has fatally
crashed on a discursive track-from Descartes to Foucault-which
is
really suspicious. Perhaps, it is not by chance that Habermas simplifies
Foucault considerably, especially the latest Foucault and, in general, it
is not by chance that strategy of difference is understood by Habermas
just as a simple polysemy.
It may be observed that even this similitude is, after all, irrelevant, if one admits that Lyotardian linguistic excess does not allude to
a space in which social action is redefined. Actually, things are not
quite like this. The Lyotard of La condition postmoderne, at least,
reaches a "practical reason," whose results are not significantly far
from Habermasian results as already indicated above. And now for
the second problem.
In short, I am convinced that the definition of a linguistically
based "practical reason" -both if it exasperates the Wittgensteinian
disenchantment without taking on its mystical disclosure, and if it
transcendentalistically re-interprets it as a rational universal-in
any
case, reaches an apparent solution to the theme of Modernity: the subject. Both the Lyotardian linguistic excess and the Habermasian excess
talk about transcendental subjects, which do interpret a large part in
the culture of modernity, but not in all of its essential articulations
inherent to the subjects (the plural is deliberate). Apart from that,
then-apart
from the fact, that is, if this really is the crunch with the
cultures of Marx and Weber-another
aspect is no less curious: both
Lyotard and Habermas, in the end, invoke, in support of the "practical
reason", empirical subjects, about which they are unable to say anything. The fact is, that proclaiming the end of a transcendental subject
is not so important if it serves to recuperate, sociologically, spaces for
generic empirical subjects-both
if they are Habermasian dialogical
agents and Lyotardian decision-makers.
Either these subjects are
empirically qualified, or it is useless to invoke even their marginal
presence. The linguistic excess is not therefore resolutive-it remains
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this side of Wittgenstein .
In other words, if the passage from Modem to Postmodern is in
these terms of difficult definition, it is also due to this: to the constant
remaining of the theme of the "community of tragic beings," within a
philosophical language which either does not have the courage to disown the human Voice and, therefore, continues to redeem its sense
within a dialogic "practical reason"; or, even though it does have the
courage, it continues to play at returning with "practical reason" as a
disagreement (where the human Voice is not removed, but the pretenses of its unirationality are annulled). In both case linguistic excess
reaches reiterated extremes, but never the radical threshold of real
silence, there where Wittgenstein is silent: "This rushing at the limits
of language is ethics" (Wittgenstein, 1980, 21-22)

4. The community of tragic beings

What is the sense of the "community of tragic beings," involved in this
silence? The osmotic proceeding of development and progress was
characteristic of full Modernity; what we are now living as our condition is, still, the constant evolution of the roots of evolution, prescinding from any normative idea of progress. We are that is "caught" in an
ambiguous development-which
does not mean "weak" or without
explicit connections of interest, of course-the
more energetic, the
more void of normative referents, which are in fact untenable, because
they are unable "to bear" a horizon of possible accomplishment.
Modernity, the ideology of progress aimed at a dialectical accomplishment, a kind of self-overcoming in development; its normative ideal
was certainly "utopian," but compulsory and therefore regulative.
Now, however, it is clear that there is no dialectical relationship
between development and progress, since the former meets and
ignores major limits-geographical,
ethical, ecological-well
before
the latter can "accomplish itself," independently of this accomplishment. Development no longer alludes to any "accomplishing-in-progress."
This is manifestly true in economic terms, it is true in political
terms. In fact, it has not only produced the enormous economic differences between the world hemispheres, but also our democratic political systems, in which the maximum transparency-and
therefore the
maximum development
reached-corresponds
to the minimum
involvement. However, it is only an apparent contradiction, since it is
really a terminal manifestation of a unique ambiguity-in
the literal
sense of the word-maximum
transparency and strategic withdrawal
in the ipseitas, to which, "enlarged," an accomplished tragic instance
corresponds: where the Modem remains an insuppressible residual
and it resolves itself in a real aesthetic of the tragic.
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This aesthetic of the tragic strengthens, at the same time, the ethical undecidibility of politics and its resolution in government. It
resolves, that is, what appears contradictory and is really ambiguous,
replacing it in a growing complexity. Actually, undecidibility and decisionism are both-even though opposites-possible
extensions of the
epistemological figure of complexity. Complexity is "a negative
notion: it expresses the fact that one does not know or one does not
understand a system, in spite of a background of global knowledge
which lets us know and denominate this system ( ... ) it implies that
one has a global perception, and at the same time the perception not to
control it in detail" (Atlan 1986, 96). The decisionistic approach, of
course, makes an "instrumental" use of the indeterminate and resolves
politics in technique; the opposite approach, viceversa, grasps in the
indeterminate the infeasibility of one technique and of that technique.
What remains common to both is anyway the "human" groundlessness of politics and the resolution of the tragic in minimal ethics. In
any case, that is, the complexity is an autopoietic figure: it interprets
possibility or impossibility of politics, always, as government-whether it is efficacious or not. Politics is "humanly" unfoundable, substantially, because it cannot be "other" with respect to government. Both
are shown in complexity, in the breaking down of self-referential
processes, in the hyperreality of a complete practical disenchantment.
The human instance does not found politics, therefore, since no superior Periclean rationality founds a privileged language of politics. What
is residual of human is only spread: minimal ethics. Without any
excessive forcing, politics, as a relationship of relationships, may be
reflected in determinate epistemological forms-"politeistic,"
"gnostic," "dual" (cf. Bateson 1972), deprived of subjects-forms which do
not admit "one" rationality and, therefore, characterize politics as a
contingent government of complexity . At any rate, the problem remains:
is it impossible that what presents itself as a postmodern transcendental aesthethic of the tragic be transftgurable into an ethics of the tragic community
of beings?

Let us assume this "datum" in order to climb back up the slope
of ethics, let us assume it, shifting however the contingent from the
political sphere to the ethical sphere. Let us turn to Baudrillard (1987).
The velocity of development characterizes social experience as a desert
in the eighties: flat territory, where any reference is absent or transitory
and therefore subject to constant shifting and cancellation. The causal
nexii are therefore forgotten; time no longer has any depth, it does not
permit plotting of indicative sedimentations, because time is spending
in the immediate of the eternal equal: the line, the geometrical element
whose curves, at the limit of possible experience, is only imaginary.
Social experience has lost the place where it can be found, because it
no longer has a memory. The "triumph of surface" creates an absent
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space where traces are unthinkable more than unobtainable. The
velocity of elapsing leaves no wake: it is pure velocity, total, which
does not remember the starting point and therefore has no destination
to reach. Amnesia makes the wayfarer inebriated, makes of it just a
moved subject, moving on a surface with no indications inherent to
the travelled and worn road, inherent to the road ahead. Pure velocity
takes the same wayfarer towards a possible catastrophe, there, where
even the inebriation of pure velocity, of the straight passing into the
immediate, is no longer noticeable by any experience. Inebriation of
development, in fact, leads to the desert, to the absent totality of social
experience: to the desert, or the place of apparent lack of life, whose
ecological balance actually keeps our infinite social history in its complex geology, in its "baroque linearity", in its past splendor, in its
remaining contingency.
The long metaphor may embody, I think, some essential assumptions: the inebriation of development leads to a desert, to absent totality of the represented human experience. Politics is a constitutive part
of this desert, it governs its "baroque linearity" in the form of repeated
and complex contingencies. Its abstraction is equal to the transparency
generated by development. Ethics, vice versa, has no relationship with
any contingency, because it is the set of contingencies, as opaque as the
idea of pro-gressoin complexity, of a striding forward. Therefore, ethics
is a residual, an indicative sediment, since the relationship between
development and progress is not resolvable, nor subject to accomplishment: it is a paradox, a modern puzzle which is destined to last as long
as the collective character of its remaining lasts. Politics consumes
time, theologically it leads to the end of times, or better, it is at the
beginning and end of time. It is theophany which has been accomplished: powers legitimate powers, contingency creates complexity.
However, ethics recuperate marginal time, what is left: in the uncertainty of duration it alludes to a destiny-shrouded
in ruins-which is
not to be accomplished.
The angel of history must have this aspect. He faces the past. Where we
are faced with a series of events, he sees a single catastrophe, which
unceasingly accumulates more and more ruins and it spills them at his
feet. He wishes to restrain himself, awake the dead and put the broken
together again. But a storm is blowing up from paradise, which has got
caught up in his wings, and is so strong as to prevent the angel from
closing his wings. This storm irresistibly pushes the angel towards the
future, to which he turns his back, while the mound of ruins rises to the
sky in front of him. (Benjamin 1981, 80).

What is ineludible is the tragic: but in the aesthetic image of politics the instantaneous time of that image is consumed; in the ethical
image our destiny remains in a deep time.
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Utopia? Not really: no ideal place returns as a lost language.
Contingency, however : "for no other cause a thing is called contingent,
except that it regards a defect in our knowledge" (Spinoza 1973,
1,33,1). Contingent ethics is, in fact, what in its complexity does not
permit: a discovery of its own "true" external determination, a sort of
emanationism. What cannot be determined positively is its cause and,
therefore, its immediate opacity, its depth in time, its residual of future
memory. It is not redemption, it is not promised accomplishment: it is
a simple and essential expression of imperfect being, of the collective
body tragically outstretched. Politics resolves itself in an aesthetic of
the tragic, since it fixes one of the possible instantaneous solutions of
the contingent in the complexity, in the image of the accomplishment
of times; ethics does not resolve itself in anything, it remains the tragic
[tried] in duration, since the complex lives in it as contingent, and this
contingent is thus constitutively unsolvable.
Negri observed (1987, 54) that "through the discovery of contingency, we put forward in radical terms the problem of foundation
(...)-this foundation is the starting point for the maximum widening
of the dimension of possibility . A tragic possibility, an eventual[ity]
that our reason and heart cannot sometimes bear-the destruction of
being, such a generalized death as not to have repetition-in
a word,
the end of time ." Independently of whether or not we consider the
problem of foundation, I believe it is essential to think of ethics as an
unfolding of possibilities; or rather, in the terms which have been used
so far, it seems essential to consider ethics not as a tragic image, an
instant which resolves time, but as tragic duration, as far as possible
linked to the safeguarding of a memory of the future: ethics can only
be a memory of the future. The extreme speeding-up of human trying
has cancelled time-duration, substituting it with time as a succession
of instants. As we have said, politics, precisely for this temporal breaking-up, can govern the complex through the contingent; ethics, viceversa, suffers this breaking up, as it is a complex contingent. In short, if an
idea of composition may be given, it will not be an idea of "recomposition," of "redressing;" it may only be given as a "possibility of possibilities," precisely, the beginning of sedimentation of a contingent in
the complex contingency, of a new "remembering" of time starting
from now: memory of the future. Ethics is the more tragic side of a
thinking which is exposed to the death of time; the extreme possibility
of not reaching the end of time, of not consuming the future in the
instant: the Modern as an insoluble residual.
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DIFFERENT/A
NOTES

1. It would not be too farfetched to state that Italian philosophical culture has attained an international relevance, especially when, beginning in the
early eighties, it tackled this thorny problem, the question of modernity. It is
understood that there had been some profound views before that, but they
were often considered as secondary against an originary European culture, or
at any rate, too heavily bogged down by ideologies, whether Catholic or marxist, which made them either too radical or too retrograde for the international
community. The paradox of the '80s is that suddenly the national fortunes are
inverted: Gentile resurfaces, while Gramsci disappears; Del Noce reemerges as
Paci and Preti vanish in the background.
Simultaneously, the doors of the
philosophical communities are open wide to non-Italian thought (thanks also
to unusual and questionable alliances).
2. In Italy, the thought of Habermas has enjoyed a vast reception and diffusion, first, in the strong French critique of Western capitalist
rationality/ pragmatism, then that baluardo beyond the lagare of luhmanian
technocratic functionalism, as it is thus originally interpreted in the ethic of the
Diskurs. Especially on the Left, its reception has been by necessity diversified,
whether in relation to the evolution of Habermasian thought, or in relation to
the diverse schools of thought and to the changing nature of its
occurrence/ application in political practice.
3. The fortune/reputation
of Lyotard in Italy is owed above all to his
pamphlet La condition postmoderne and consequently, to more strictly philosophical texts. On the other hand, the translation of this text in 1979 happened
at a moment in in which more than ever, philosophy recognized the growing
impact of information technology and the technologies of knowledge. One has
only to look at the collected issues of "alfabeta" or "aut aut" of those years.
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